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The advent of the Internet as an instru-
ment for business commerce has fundamentally
altered the economy by ushering in increased
efficiencies and more transparent markets. Since
businesses started conducting Internet transac-
tions in 1995, the growth has been impressive.
Forrester Research estimates that worldwide
electronic commerce (e-commerce) revenues
were about $650 billion in 2000 and projects
they will grow to $6.8 trillion by 2004.
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The greatest impact is in the business-
to-business (B2B) sector, where new supply-
chain models within electronic marketplaces
(eMarketplaces) enable companies to signifi-
cantly lower procurement costs and increase
operating efficiencies. B2B eMarketplaces
streamline the supply chain by making better
use of more information. The time it takes to
match buyers and sellers can be radically
reduced, precautionary inventory levels can be
lowered, and the range of potential suppliers
and distribution outlets can be expanded as
geographic boundaries disappear.
Projections of online B2B revenues differ
vastly, primarily because defining what counts
and how to count it varies widely. But despite
these differences, forecasters agree that online
B2B trade will grow substantially. B2B e-com-
merce is generally believed to account for about
80 to 90 percent of total e-commerce today.
Forecasts typically project U.S. online B2B reve-
nues of about $2 trillion by 2003, up from
roughly $336 billion in 2000.
B2B e-commerce is expected to impact
the U.S. economy significantly. Brookes and
Wahhaj (2000) argue that the rapid growth of
B2B e-commerce will have an economic impact
over and above that of the normal process of
innovation and productivity growth. They sug-
gest that as a result of B2B e-commerce, annual
GDP growth in the large industrialized countries
should rise an average 0.25 percent for the next
ten years—with the level of GDP eventually 
5 percent higher than it would otherwise have
been. Brookes and Wahhaj conclude that the
dominant long-run effect of B2B e-commerce
will be on output and equity markets, rather
than on inflation and bond markets.
Investors should respond favorably to
announcements of new B2B e-commerce initia-
tives, as long as they believe these moves will
ultimately result in higher profits and increased
productivity without fueling inflation. We exam-
ine the potential impact of B2B e-commerce ini-
tiatives on the New Economy paradigm using
the efficient markets hypothesis (Fama et al.
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available information about individual compa-
nies and about the economy as a whole. Infor-
mation is the key input. So in efficient capital
markets, prices will immediately adjust to reflect
any new information. Thus, B2B e-commerce
announcements should immediately raise stock
prices if investors believe a firm’s value will 
be increased by higher net future cash flows 
resulting from higher productivity, lower costs,
or higher revenues.
This article empirically investigates B2B
eMarketplace announcements from the financial
market’s perspective. Overall, are online B2B
exchanges creating shareholder wealth? Do the
returns to shareholders of firms that announce
vertical (intra-industry) exchanges and those
that announce horizontal (cross-industry) ex-
changes differ? Are the returns higher when
firms go it alone in developing an eMarketplace
than when they do so with other B2B e-com-
merce companies or Old Economy leaders? And
what are the returns to shareholders of firms
that acquire other B2B e-commerce technology
providers?
This article addresses these questions
using event-study methodology, a useful tool
for examining the consensus estimates of future
benefits attributable to organizational initia-
tives.
2 Stock returns are analyzed relative to a
portfolio of stocks representing the market.
Differences in returns are analyzed on days
leading up to and following the event date—in
this case, the B2B eMarketplace announcement
date—to determine whether shareholder returns
differ significantly from the general market
return for stocks. The strength of this method-
ology is that it captures a large number of
investors’ overall assessment of a firm’s dis-
counted present value.
Subramani and Walden (1999) were the
first to use event studies to explore why firms
might pursue e-commerce initiatives. They ex-
amined 305 e-commerce announcements made
between October and December 1998 and
found that these announcements resulted in
positive cumulative abnormal returns to firms’
shareholders. Contrary to their hypothesis, they
found that business-to-consumer (B2C) e-com-
merce announcements resulted in higher abnor-
mal returns than B2B announcements. For B2B
initiatives, Subramani and Walden found aver-
age abnormal returns of 5.9 percent on the
event date and 11.3 percent for a three-day
window starting one day before the event.
Using the event-study methodology, dif-
ferences in returns to companies engaged in
vertical and horizontal B2B eMarketplaces can
be assessed. The returns to firms that ally them-
selves with other technology providers and
those that team with Old Economy leaders can
also be compared. Classifying B2B eMarketplace
announcements by the type of eMarketplace and
the type of partner reveals key differences in
how the financial markets assess B2B e-com-
merce strategies.
WHY EMARKETPLACES?
Information networks create transparency
in markets that substantially reduces transaction
costs. Previously unavailable or hard-to-obtain
intelligence increases transparency. In exchange
markets, transparency along the supply chain
regarding price, availability, competing suppli-
ers, and alternative products can radically
change the dynamics of the buyer–seller rela-
tionship. Both parties can benefit as shared
information increases competition and reduces
costs for searching, bargaining, decisionmaking,
policing, and enforcement.
Internet exchanges introduce unprece-
dented market and process transparency. B2B
eMarketplaces can provide nearly perfect infor-
mation at all points along the supply chain,
increasing efficiency and lowering participants’
costs. Such exchanges also enable companies to
develop, manage, and monitor internal and
external processes—including work in process
and finished-goods inventories—far more effi-
ciently and effectively. The improved coordina-
tion that results gets the right goods and ser-
vices to the right places at the right times with
lower costs.
B2B eMarketplaces can be divided into
two types: vertical and horizontal. Vertical mar-
kets are industry-specific; they focus on an 
individual industry, such as steel, plastics, elec-
tronic components, or chemicals. Electronic ex-
changes in vertical markets serve participants
primarily by bringing buyers and sellers to-
gether to transact business up and down the
entire industry supply chain. They also provide
industry-specific news and information and
other value-added services, such as employment
opportunities, discussion forums, and event 
calendars that create community within the
industry. These benefits can substantially reduce
operating costs.
In contrast, horizontal markets cross indus-
tries. They focus on creating an exchange for
goods and services at a specific link in the supply
chain that is common to multiple industries, such
as MRO (maintenance, repair, and operations)
supplies, logistics, and benefits administration.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 14
Typically, goods and services exchanged over
horizontal eMarkets are standardized and can be
outsourced to third-party providers that have
well-defined, fixed-price products. As a result, the
value added by horizontal eMarketplaces is in
automating workflow and reducing process costs
to the participants of the exchange. This enables
businesses in various industries to operate more
efficiently and effectively.
We further divide B2B eMarketplace
announcements by the type of partner, if any,
the e-commerce technology provider said it
would be working with, using the following five
categories of partnership:
Acquisition. The e-commerce technology
provider announced plans to acquire another
technology firm to aid in the development of a
B2B eMarketplace.
Alone. The e-commerce technology provider
announced plans to develop a B2B eMarketplace
on its own.
Alliance: Computer. The e-commerce tech-
nology provider announced plans to develop a
B2B eMarketplace with a large and well-recog-
nized computer industry leader, such as IBM
Corp., Microsoft Corp., or EDS Corp.
Alliance: Competitor. The e-commerce
technology provider announced plans to de-
velop a B2B eMarketplace with a competitor.
Alliance: Old Economy. The e-commerce
technology provider announced plans to de-
velop a B2B eMarketplace with an Old Economy
leader (for example, General Motors or Ford in
the automotive industry, Shell or Chevron in the
energy industry).
Using these partnership classifications, vari-
ous hypotheses can be tested to determine the
value of different B2B e-commerce strategies.
HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1: Positive Returns for B2B
eMarketplace Announcements
As Subramani and Walden (1999) discuss,
e-commerce initiatives should position firms to
exploit the growing importance of and expected
growth in electronic commerce, leading to 
benefits in the future. Such initiatives signal that
a firm plans to use information technology to
better manage industry supply chains. Conse-
quently, we expect that investors will react
favorably to B2B eMarketplace announcements,
resulting in positive abnormal stock market
returns (that is, risk-adjusted returns in excess of
average stock market returns) around the date
of the announcement. Alternatively, negative
abnormal returns might indicate that investors
view a B2B eMarketplace as an unprofitable
strategy, perhaps because they suspect factors
other than shareholder maximization motivated
the initiative. Such factors might include man-
agement’s level of compensation, job security,
and span of control. 
Among the benefits touted in announce-
ments of new B2B eMarketplaces are the ability
to:
• Expose sellers in one marketplace to all
potential buyers.
• Create a hub for development projects,
market feedback, and customer collabo-
ration.
• Reduce time to market.
• Provide expansive catalogs of products
and services.
• Provide end customers with fast re-
sponse, high cost efficiency, and supe-
rior service.
• Increase operating efficiency through an
integrated Internet supply chain.
• Streamline purchasing operations.
• Reduce supply-chain costs, increase
manufacturing efficiency, and reduce in-
ventories.
• Reduce cycle times, improve transaction
flows, and manage parts inventories.
Hypothesis 2: Higher Returns for 
Vertical eMarketplaces Than for 
Horizontal eMarketplaces
Because vertical eMarketplaces focus on
the needs of an entire industry (up and down
the supply chain) and horizontal eMarketplaces
focus on specific business processes that span
multiple vertical markets (individual links in the
supply chain), we expect vertical eMarketplaces
will have higher abnormal returns than horizon-
tal eMarketplaces. If horizontal eMarketplaces
have abnormal returns higher than vertical
eMarketplaces, this might indicate that investors
consider productivity improvements gained
through providing goods and services at a spe-
cific link in the supply chain across industries of
greater value than efficiency gains along the
supply chain.
Hypothesis 3: Insignificant Returns to 
Firms Announcing the Acquisition of Another 
E-Commerce Technology Provider
Generally, alliances and mergers are
designed to create competitive advantages and
should therefore enhance market valuations.
However, we expect that announcements of 
e-commerce technology firms’ plans to acquire
another such provider will not result in signifi-15 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 2001
cantly positive abnormal returns. This is be-
cause acquiring firms typically must pay a sub-
stantial premium for target firms, which is often
viewed unfavorably by the financial market
(Roll 1988). If acquiring firms produce signifi-
cantly positive abnormal returns, this might
indicate that investors expect these firms to gen-
erate synergies via economies of scale or scope
by reducing costs and eliminating redundancies.
This outcome could also indicate that investors
see potential gains from providing a larger
selection of products and services or the possi-
bility of enhancing market power by reducing
price competition.
Hypothesis 4: Higher Returns to Firms Forming
Alliances When Announcing New eMarketplaces
We expect significant positive abnormal
stock returns to e-commerce technology firms
announcing B2B eMarketplaces, whether they
develop the marketplaces by themselves or with
another firm. However, we expect that alliances
with other companies—whether they are com-
puter industry giants, competitors, or Old
Economy leaders—will result in higher abnor-
mal returns than creating an eMarketplace alone
would.
3 This would occur if investors foresee
potential synergies and competitive advantages
from allying with firms that have similar objec-
tives. Alliances also create more support and
depth for the eMarketplace. If an e-commerce
technology firm that announces plans to de-
velop B2B eMarketplaces by itself generates
higher abnormal returns than firms that plan to
align with others, this might indicate investors
foresee potential problems with the proposed
alliance.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Event-study methodology is a forward-
looking approach that focuses on identifying
abnormal returns to firms from a specific event.
If investors react favorably to an event, positive
abnormal stock returns around the event date
would be expected. Consequently, abnormal
returns provide a means of assessing an initia-
tive’s impact on a firm’s future profitability.
Event-study methodology is based on the
efficient markets hypothesis (Fama et al. 1969)
—that is, as new information becomes avail-
able, it is fully taken into consideration by
investors assessing its current and future impact.
The new assessment results in stock price
changes that reflect the discounted value of cur-
rent and future firm performance. Significant
positive or negative stock price changes can
then be attributed to individual events. The
strength of the method lies in its ability to iden-
tify such abnormal changes because it is based
on the overall assessment of many investors
who quickly process all available information in
assessing a firm’s market value (McWilliams and
Siegel 1997).
To know what a firm’s stock price would
have been in the absence of the event (in this
case, the B2B eMarketplace announcement), the
price is regressed against a market index to 
control for overall market effects. To calculate
abnormal returns, the estimated coefficients
from the market-model regression are used to
compute the predicted value of the firm’s stock.
For each security j, the following regression
model is used to calculate abnormal returns at
time t:
(1) ARjt = Rjt – (α j + β jRmt),
where ARjt is the abnormal return for stock j at
time t; Rjt is the actual return for stock j at time
t; α j is the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate
of the intercept of the market-model regression;
Rmt is the return to the market at time t, as
approximated by Standard & Poor’s 500 stock
market index; and β j is the OLS estimate of the
slope of the coefficient in the market-model
regression.
4
The parameters α j and  β j are estimated
from the market model as follows:
(2) Rjt = α j + β jRmt + ε jt,
where ε jt is the residual. Daily returns for in-
dividual-firm stock prices and the market index
are from the Center for Research in Securities
Prices database. The date of the event (announce-
ment) is t = 0, the market model is estimated
over the period from t = –165 to t = –15 days
relative to the event date, and the event window
is from t = –1 to t = +1.
Once the market model is estimated, the
resulting estimated values for α j and β j are used
in Equation 1 with data for Rjt and Rmt to calcu-
late the abnormal returns (ARs) over the event
window for each e-commerce technology firm.
Because the event date is known, a short win-
dow is used (Armitage 1995). In addition to 
the abnormal returns computed for the day
before the announcement (t = –1), the day of
the announcement (t = 0), and the day follow-
ing the announcement (t = +1), we also com-
pute cumulative average abnormal returns
(CARs) for the periods from t = –1 to t = 0 and
from t = –1 to t = +1. Dyckman, Philbrick, and
Stephan (1984) find that two- and three-dayFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 16
Table 1
B2B eMarketplace Announcements, July 1999–March 2000
Type of E-commerce
Announcement B2B technology
date eMarketplace provider(s) Announcement
7/28/1999 Horizontal Oracle Oracle announces online B2B eMarketplace
10/11/1999 Horizontal i2 Technologies i2 announces new business eMarketplace
10/21/1999 Vertical VerticalNet VerticalNet and IBM to create eMarketplace
11/02/1999 Vertical Oracle Ford and Oracle to create B2B eMarketplace
11/02/1999 Vertical Commerce One General Motors joins Commerce One to create B2B eMarketplace
11/05/1999 Horizontal Commerce One Commerce One acquires CommerceBid.com
11/08/1999 Horizontal Grainger Grainger.com debuts B2B eMarketplace
11/15/1999 Horizontal Ariba Ariba acquires TradingDynamics
12/16/1999 Horizontal Ariba Ariba acquires TRADEX
12/21/1999 Vertical i2 Technologies i2 announces eMarketplace for high-tech companies
1/10/2000 Horizontal Ariba EDS and Ariba to create group of B2B eMarkets
1/13/2000 Vertical Commerce One Shell and Commerce One announce joint venture to build energy industry
eMarketplace
1/17/2000 Horizontal i2 Technologies i2 announces B2B eMarketplace for consumer goods and retail companies
1/19/2000 Vertical i2 Technologies, General Motors and Commerce One add i2’s B2B supply chain services to
Commerce One eMarketplace
1/19/2000 Vertical Ariba Chevron and Ariba unveil eMarketplace for energy industry
1/20/2000 Vertical VerticalNet VerticalNet and Microsoft join to accelerate B2B commerce on the Internet
2/09/2000 Vertical Ariba Azurix introduces Ariba-powered eMarketplace for water buyers and sellers
2/14/2000 Vertical i2 Technologies United Technologies, Honeywell, and i2 to create eMarketplace for aerospace industry
2/17/2000 Horizontal Commerce One Citigroup and Commerce One announce plan to build eMarketplace
2/23/2000 Vertical i2 Technologies Toyota and i2 form eMarketplace for automotive replacement parts market
2/23/2000 Vertical Commerce One BellSouth and Commerce One launch joint venture to build eMarketplaces for
telecommunications industry
2/25/2000 Vertical Commerce One, Ford, General Motors, and DaimlerChrysler create eMarketplace
Oracle
2/28/2000 Vertical Oracle Sears, Carrefour, and Oracle to form eMarketplace for retail industry
2/28/2000 Vertical i2 Technologies i2 creates eMarketplace for softgoods industry
2/29/2000 Horizontal i2 Technologies i2 creates eMarketplace for logistics industry
3/01/2000 Vertical Ariba Sabre and Ariba announce B2B eMarketplace for travel and transportation industry
3/08/2000 Horizontal Ariba, IBM, Ariba, and i2 form alliance to accelerate global adoption and benefits of 
i2 Technologies B2B e-commerce
3/08/2000 Vertical VerticalNet VerticalNet to acquire Tradeum to expand B2B e-commerce platform
3/08/2000 Vertical Oracle Chevron, McLane, and Oracle to form eMarketplace for convenience store industry
3/13/2000 Vertical Oracle Oracle and fibermarket.com announce B2B eMarketplace for global forest 
products industry
3/14/2000 Vertical Ariba Cargill and Ariba announce eMarketplace for food and beverage industries
3/15/2000 Horizontal FreeMarkets FreeMarkets announces agreement to acquire iMark.com
3/22/2000 Horizontal FreeMarkets FreeMarkets announces agreement to acquire Surplus Record and SR Auction
3/22/2000 Horizontal i2 Technologies i2 announces eMarketplace for aftermarket parts and service management
3/23/2000* Vertical Commerce One Boeing, Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, and Raytheon to create B2B eMarketplace
for aerospace and defense industry
3/26/2000 Vertical Oracle Hutchison and Oracle announce B2B eMarketplace for transportation service
industry
* The press release was dated March 28, 2000, but on March 23, several newspapers reported these firms’ plans to form a B2B exchange.17 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 2001
event windows are preferable to one-day win-
dows because of rumors of the announcement
and insider information. These calculations indi-
cate whether the returns to the shareholders of
the e-commerce technology providers are
abnormal compared with those expected from
general market movements. 
The market model in Equation 2 breaks
down the total return on stock j into two 
components: one that reflects general market
movements and one that reflects price varia-
tions caused by firm-specific events. Deducting
(α j + β jRmt) from Rjt (as shown in Equation 1)
neutralizes the effect of general market move-
ments but does not neutralize firm-specific price
variations caused by events other than the
eMarketplace announcement. To neutralize
these firm-specific variations, the cross-sectional
average of the abnormal returns for the total
sample of stocks for each period is computed.
For a sample of n stocks, the mean abnormal
return for each day t is
where t = –1, 0, +1. The cross-sectional average
neutralizes firm-specific price variations unre-
lated to the B2B eMarketplace announcements.
Hence, the expected value of MARt is zero in
the absence of abnormal returns due to B2B
eMarketplace announcements.
The final calculation of abnormal returns
is to compute cumulative average abnormal re-
turns from day t = –1 to t = 0 and from t = –1
to t = +1, using the formula
where t1 = (0, +1) and CAR(–1,t1) is the cumu-
lative average abnormal return for the sample 
of n stocks over the event period interval from
t = –1 to t1. The expected value of CAR is zero
in the absence of abnormal performance. Tests of
significance are discussed in the box on page 20.
Table 1 lists the announcements in our
sample. We define an event as the release of a
firm’s B2B eMarketplace announcement through
the media.
5 Our events are derived from a list of
defining events in B2B by Phillips and Meeker
(2000). The events in this report include
announcements of B2B e-commerce IPOs,
eMarketplaces, acquisitions, joint ventures, and
alliances. We include all announcements that
involved an established, publicly traded e-com-
merce technology provider except those that
announced an IPO. The resulting thirty-six
announcements include thirty-nine individual


















stock price events and cover the period from
July 28, 1999, through March 26, 2000.
SHAREHOLDER RETURNS
Table 2 presents a summary of the aver-
age abnormal returns for all the firms in our
sample, as well as a breakdown by whether
they are announcing horizontal or vertical B2B
eMarketplaces.
6 Average abnormal returns for
five event periods are reported: the day before
the announcement, the day of the announce-
ment, the day following the announcement,
cumulative returns from the day before the
announcement to the day of the announcement,
and cumulative returns from the day before 
the announcement to the day following the
announcement. Also reported are the t statistics
and significance levels that test whether the
returns differ significantly from zero.
All of the announcements taken together
produced positive ARs to shareholders. Most
noteworthy are the two- and three-day CARs.
The two-day CAR is 5.3 percent, and the three-
day CAR is 7.38 percent, with twenty-six of the
thirty-nine firms receiving positive abnormal
returns during both event windows. Abnormal
returns to shareholders are significantly different
from zero for both windows at the 0.01 level.
This result strongly supports Hypothesis 1,
which postulates that investors react favorably
to firms announcing B2B eMarketplaces.
When the announcements are segregated
by the type of B2B eMarketplace, we find both
horizontal and vertical eMarketplace announce-
ments result in significantly positive CARs.
Table 2
Average Abnormal Returns by Type of eMarketplace
Horizontal Vertical
Event period Overall eMarketplace eMarketplace
Day before announcement 1.25% 1.33% 1.19%
(t = –1) (1.893) (1.228) (1.442)
Day of announcement 4.05%*** 3.55%** 4.36%***
(t = 0) (4.401) (2.168) (3.896)
Day after announcement 2.08% 1.18% 2.64%
(t = +1) (2.151) ( .862) (2.060)
Two-day event window 5.30%*** 4.88%** 5.56%***
(t = –1 to t = 0) (4.450) (2.401) (3.774)
Three-day event window 7.38%*** 6.06%** 8.20%**
(t = –1 to t = +1) (4.875) (2.459) (4.271)
Number of firms 39 15 24
***Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
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Horizontal B2B eMarketplace announcements
result in a two-day CAR of 4.88 percent and a
three-day CAR of 6.06 percent. Ten of the fifteen
firms making a horizontal B2B eMarketplace
announcement received a positive return in
both windows.
For vertical B2B eMarketplace announce-
ments, the two-day CAR is 5.56 percent and 
the three-day CAR is 8.2 percent. Sixteen of 
the twenty-four firms making a vertical B2B
eMarketplace announcement received a positive
return in both windows. While the returns are
higher for firms making vertical eMarketplace
announcements, they do not statistically differ
from the returns for firms making horizontal
eMarketplace announcements. These results lend
weak support to Hypothesis 2, in that investors
prefer vertical over horizontal eMarketplaces,
although the positive abnormal returns for both
groups are not statistically different. In any case,
investors seem to view both types of eMarket-
places favorably and anticipate increased effi-
ciencies and reduced costs that will produce
future benefits.
Table 3 shows the results of dividing the
B2B eMarketplace announcements by the type
of partner, if any, the e-commerce technology
provider announced it would be working with.
For the six firms that announced they were
acquiring another e-commerce company, the
two- and three-day CARs are 1.15 percent and
4.1 percent, respectively, neither of which is sig-
nificantly different from zero. Interestingly, the
AR for the day before the announcement is
–3.24 percent, with five of the six firms experi-
encing negative abnormal returns. This negative
average abnormal return is quickly erased, how-
ever, as five of the six firms received positive
ARs on the day of the announcement, for an
average event-day return of 4.39 percent. In
conformance with Hypothesis 3, these results
suggest investors see acquisitions of other tech-
nology providers as neither a positive nor a
negative.
For the nine firms announcing plans to
develop B2B eMarketplaces on their own, the
two- and three-day CARs are 3.95 percent and
4.84 percent, respectively. Neither CAR is signif-
icantly different from zero. However, it is inter-
esting that the first five announcements (those
prior to February 2000) resulted in significantly
positive CARs, whereas the last four announce-
ments (those after January 2000) resulted in sig-
nificantly negative CARs. The two- and three-
day CARs for the first five announcements are
9.38 percent and 15.91 percent, respectively.
For the last four announcements, the two- and
three-day event-window returns are –2.83 per-
cent and –9 percent, respectively. These results
suggest the possibility of a first-mover advan-
Table 3
Average Abnormal Returns by Type of Partner
Alliance Alliance Alliance
Event period Acquisition Alone computer competitor Old Economy
Day before announcement –3.24%* .70% 4.82%** .47% 2.39%
(t = –1) (–1.025) (.723) (1.774) (–.062) (2.148)
Day of announcement 4.39%* 3.25% 7.40%*** 11.09%*** 1.40%
(t = 0) (1.488) (1.831) (2.551) (4.331) (1.027)
Day after announcement 2.96% .89% 6.25% 2.88% .84%
(t = +1) (1.016) (.925) (2.158) (.773) (.464)
Two-day event window 1.15% 3.95% 12.22%*** 11.55%*** 3.79%
(t = –1 to t = 0) (.328) (1.806) (3.058) (3.019) (2.245)
Three-day event window 4.10% 4.84% 18.46%** 14.43%** 4.64%
(t = –1 to t = +1) (.854) (2.008) (3.743) (2.911) (2.101)
Number of firms 6 9 5 4 15
***Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
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tage to firms that position themselves as B2B
eMarketplace leaders. (This is discussed with
respect to the entire sample below.)
For firms announcing alliances to develop
B2B eMarketplaces with other firms, the returns
are positive and mostly significant, as Hypothesis
4 suggests. The two- and three-day CARs for the
five firms announcing an alliance to develop a
B2B eMarketplace with a large and established
computer industry business are 12.22 percent
and 18.46 percent, respectively. For the four
firms announcing an alliance with another 
e-commerce technology provider, the two- and
three-day event-window returns are 11.55 per-
cent and 14.43 percent, respectively. Taken to-
gether, such alliances result in two- and three-
day CARs of 11.92 percent and 16.67 percent,
respectively, both of which are significant at the
0.01 level.
7
The firms announcing the development of
B2B eMarketplaces with Old Economy leaders
also received positive average abnormal returns,
but they are not significantly different from
zero. The two- and three-day CARs for the fif-
teen firms announcing B2B eMarketplaces with
these leaders are 3.79 percent and 4.64 percent,
respectively. Nine of the fifteen firms received
positive returns over the two event windows. It
appears investors view alliances with industry
leaders favorably. However, the returns are fairly
low (and not significantly different from zero),
especially when compared with the returns
from alliances with competitors and computer
industry leaders.
In fact, returns for alliances with competi-
tors and computer industry leaders are signifi-
cantly higher than those made through partner-
ships with Old Economy leaders. Investors may
react more favorably to competitor and com-
puter industry partnerships because of the per-
ceived synergies, name recognition, and in-
creased operating efficiencies created by such
alliances. Also, these partnerships mean neither
party has to expend additional resources to
compete for B2B eMarketplace business.
Table 4 shows the results from examining
the timing of the announcements. The earlier
announcements received ARs and CARs much
higher than announcements made later during
our sample period. The 1999 announcements
have two- and three-day CARs of 9.26 percent
and 16.04 percent, respectively. These returns
are significantly different from zero at the 0.01
level, and all ten firms making these announce-
ments experienced positive abnormal returns
over the three-day event window.
For the seven firms making announce-
ments in January 2000, six experienced two-
and three-day positive CARs. As a whole, these
firms have two- and three-day CARs of 7.2 per-
cent and 14.75 percent, respectively, which are
both significant at the 0.10 level. But the returns
get lower later in the sample period. For Feb-
ruary 2000, six of the ten firms received positive
Table 4
Average Abnormal Returns by the Timing of the Announcement
Event period 1999 January 2000 February 2000 March 2000
Day before announcement 3.31% 2.33% 2.23% –1.92%
(t = –1) (2.114) (1.143) (1.699) (–.942)
Day of announcement 5.95%*** 4.87%** 3.94% 2.08%
(t = 0) (3.218) (2.121) (2.128) (1.433)
Day after announcement 6.78%*** 7.55% –2.40% –1.29%
(t = +1) (3.526) (3.480) (–1.147) (–.952)
Two-day event window 9.26%*** 7.20%* 6.16%** .16%
(t = –1 to t = 0) (3.770) (2.309) (2.706) (.348)
Three-day event window 16.04%*** 14.75%* 3.76% –1.13%
(t = –1 to t = +1) (5.114) (3.894) (1.548) (– .266)
Number of firms 10 7 10 12
***Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
NOTE: t statistics in parentheses.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 20
abnormal returns over the event windows.
Overall, the ten firms have two- and three-day
CARs of 6.16 percent and 3.76 percent, respec-
tively. Only the two-day event-window return is
significant at the 0.05 level.
In March 2000, investors began to dump
technology stocks and firms making B2B
eMarketplace announcements no longer experi-
enced significantly positive abnormal returns.
Only four of the twelve firms making B2B 
e-commerce announcements in March have
positive CARs over the event windows. Overall,
for the two- and three-day event periods, CARs
are 0.16 percent and –1.13 percent, respectively,
neither of which is significantly different from
zero.
Thus, before February 2000, firms making
B2B eMarketplace announcements generally
received significantly positive abnormal returns.
For the firms in our sample, the two- and three-
day CARs are 8.41 percent and 15.51 percent,
respectively, both of which are significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 0.01 level. After January
2000, however, investors reacted less favorably
to B2B eMarketplace announcements. While the
CARs are still positive, they are not significantly
different from zero. The two-day CAR for firms
making announcements in February and March
2000 is 2.89 percent. The three-day CAR is 1.09
percent.
These results suggest the possibility of sig-
nificant first-mover advantages.
8 However, this
conclusion must be viewed with caution
because of the extreme volatility of technology
stocks at the end of our sample period. The
Internet sector in general has experienced sub-
stantial volatility, making those firms particularly
sensitive to announcements of B2B e-commerce
initiatives.
CONCLUSIONS
Table 5 summarizes our hypotheses and
findings. Overall, we find that shareholders
view B2B eMarketplace announcements favor-
ably. These initiatives promised increased 
efficiencies and reduced costs from stream-
lining operations up, down, and across industry
supply chains. Firms making B2B eMarketplace
announcements  received significantly positive
average abnormal returns around the date 
of the announcement, suggesting that B2B 
e-commerce strategies create significant future
benefits.
We also find significant positive average
abnormal returns associated with both vertical
and horizontal eMarketplace announcements. The
returns to firms making vertical eMarketplace
announcements are slightly higher than those 
to firms making horizontal announcements, but
they do not differ significantly. It appears
investors foresee gains from both types of
eMarketplaces, whether they create efficiencies
up and down the supply chain or at a single
point across the supply chains of different
industries.
Tests of Significance
To test the significance of MARt, the average standardized abnormal return is
estimated using the following statistic, as described in Dodd and Warner (1983):
where sjt is the estimated standard deviation of the abnormal returns for stock j in
event period t and is computed by
where sj
2 is security j’s residual variance from the market-model regression, T is the
number of days in the estimation period (150), Rmt is the rate of return on the market
index for day t of the event period, R –
m is the mean rate of return on the market index
during the estimation period, and Rmk is the rate of return on the market index for
day k of the estimation period.
As shown in Equation B.2, the standard error of the forecast for the event
period, sjt, involves a slight adjustment from the standard error of the estimate, sj.
This adjustment reflects the deviations of the independent variables in the estima-
tion period from the values employed in the original regression and are typically
close to 1 (Peterson 1989).
Assuming cross-sectional independence, SARt approaches a normal distribu-
tion and the test statistic is unit normal:
This test statistic is used to test the hypothesis that the average abnormal
returns for a given sample of stocks (MARt) are significantly different from zero at
various levels for each of the event periods t =  –1, 0, +1.
A similar test statistic is employed to test the hypothesis that the cumulative
average abnormal returns (CAR) are significantly different from zero. In this case,
the relevant test statistic must be modified to fit the particular interval over which the
returns are calculated, as follows:
where t1 =  (0, +1) to compute cumulative average abnormal returns over the two-day
event period from t = –1 to t = 0 and the three-day event period from t = –1 to t = +1.
To test whether abnormal returns from two groups of stocks statistically differ,
we use
where CAR1 is the cumulative average abnormal return for one group of stocks,
CAR2 is the cumulative average abnormal return for another group of stocks, T is the
number of days in the estimation period (150), Zt is the difference in returns between
CAR1 and CAR2 at time t, and Z is the average difference in returns between CAR1
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When subdividing the data by the type of
partner the e-commerce provider aligns with,
we find that investors reward firms the most
when they partner with a competitor, especially
a large computer-industry giant like IBM,
Microsoft, or EDS. Abnormal returns from these
announcements are more than three times
higher than those from announcements of plans
to develop a B2B eMarketplace alone or with an
Old Economy leader. This is noteworthy, as it
suggests that shareholders value alliances be-
tween e-commerce technology providers more
than solo B2B e-commerce initiatives or those
undertaken with an Old Economy leader. One
explanation for this is that when e-commerce
technology firms combine resources, there is one
less competitor. When e-commerce technology
providers develop B2B e-commerce strategies
on their own or with an industry leader, com-
petition is not lessened and investors view the
news less favorably.
Finally, we find that announcements made
earlier in our sample period had much higher
average abnormal returns than announcements
made closer to the end of the period. One pos-
sible explanation is a first-mover advantage:
investors may tend to reward firms that posi-
tion themselves as leaders and pioneers in B2B
e-commerce. Another explanation may be the
sample period used. During 1999 and early 2000,
technology stocks were the darlings of Wall Street.
But in late February and early March 2000, in-
vestors began to dump them because of increas-
ing fear that these stocks were overvalued.
Because our sample period covers this unsettled
time, returns may be somewhat distorted.
NOTES
The authors would like to thank John Duca, Kenneth
Robinson, and Mark Wynne for their extremely insight-
ful comments and suggestions, which improved the
quality of this article.
1 See www.forrester.com/ER/Press/ForrFind/
0,1768,0,00.html.
2 McWilliams and Siegel (1997) outline procedures for
using the event-study framework.
3 While we have no information about whether alliances
with competitors, computer industry giants, or Old
Economy leaders will result in higher abnormal returns,
we can test for significant statistical differences
between groups of stocks.
4 Most published event studies use the S&P 500 index
to estimate the parameters for calculating abnormal
returns.
5 Because information about B2B eMarketplace
announcements may have leaked prior to the issuance
of press releases, a search of major news and busi-
ness publications using the Dow Jones Interactive
News Service was conducted to see if any information
was anticipated. In one case—Commerce One’s
involvement with the creation of a B2B exchange for
Table 5
Summary of Hypotheses and Findings
Hypothesis Findings
1. For e-commerce firms making B2B
eMarketplace announcements, the abnormal
returns should be positive.
2. Abnormal returns to firms announcing vertical
eMarketplaces should be greater than those to
firms announcing horizontal eMarketplaces.
3. Firms announcing plans for the acquisition of 
e-commerce technology providers should
experience insignificant abnormal returns.
4. Firms announcing alliances to develop B2B
eMarketplaces should receive higher abnormal
returns than those creating B2B eMarketplaces
on their own.
Strong statistical support.
(Abnormal returns are positive and significantly
different from zero.)
Weak support.
(The two groups do not statistically differ, although
both groups have positive abnormal returns
significantly different from zero.)
Support.
(Abnormal returns are positive but not significantly
different from zero.)
Strong statistical support.
(Abnormal returns are highest for alliances with
competitors and computer industry giants.These
returns are significantly different from the
abnormal returns for alliances with Old Economy
leaders and going it alone.)FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 22
the aerospace and defense industry—there were
several news reports five days prior to the March 28,
2000, press release. As a result, the event window
used for this announcement is based on a March 23
announcement date.
6 All the abnormal returns this article reports are based
on using the S&P 500 stock market index in the
market-model regressions. These results are, however,
qualitatively robust when using either the Wilshire 5000
stock market index or the Nasdaq composite stock
index. These other indexes were used to test whether
the technology-sector stock correction of early 2000
and potential investor sentiment swings affected
relative returns.
7 Because of the low number of observations, these
results must be viewed with caution. Nevertheless,
taken together, alliances with computer industry giants
and competitors in B2B e-commerce initiatives do
generate statistically significant positive abnormal
returns. Further, the statistical significance for these
results is not driven by any particularly large return 
for just one firm.
8 Milbourn, Boot, and Thakor (1999) discuss why
shareholders should benefit from scope-expanding
early entry.
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